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Abstract
We argue that the notion of epistemic possible worlds in constructivism (intuition-
ism) is not as the same as it is in classic view, and there are possibilities, called
non-predetermined worlds, which are ignored in (classic) Epistemic Logic. Regarding
non-predetermined possibilities, we propose a constructive epistemic logic and prove
soundness and completeness theorems for it. We extend the proposed logic by adding
a public announcement operator. To declare the significance of our work, we formulate
the well-known Surprise Exam Paradox, SEP, via the proposed constructive epistemic
logic and then put forward a solution for the paradox. We clarify that the puzzle in the
SEP is because of students’(wrong) assumption that the day of the exam is necessarily
predetermined.
In (classic) epistemic logic (see [4]), the knowledge of an agent is modelled through two
fundamental notions
1- possible worlds (states) and
2- Indistinguishability.
An agent knows some fact if it is true in all possible worlds that the agent cannot distinguish
them from the actual world.
To propose a Constructive Epistemic Logic, we first emphasize that the notion of possible
worlds in intuitionism (constructivism) is not as the same as it is in classic view. It is our
main idea that leads us to introduce an Epistemic logic from intuitionistic (constructive)
point of view.
Our proposed constructive epistemic logic is not much different with (classic) epistemic
logic except that it admits a new kind of possible worlds called non-predetermined worlds
where the facts of the worlds have not necessarily been determined already!
Suppose I announce on Facebook that I like one and only one of the days of the next
week, and on each day, I will write on my Facebook at 10am and announce that whether I
like the day or not. Also, suppose that it is Monday 10am now, and I am going to announce
my idea about the day. What is the actual world that I am present in? I can announce p :
“I like Monday” and also I can announce ¬p: “I do not like Monday”. That is, in the actual
world that I live, it is not determined neither p nor ¬p yet. Kripke models which are defined
as semantics of (classic) epistemic logic cannot model the notion of predetermination. For
each (classic) epistemic state (M,s) and each atomic formula q, we have either (M,s) |= q or
(M,s) |= ¬q. Let (N, t) be a (classic) epistemic state which describes my state on Monday.
Then either (N, t) |= p or (N, t) |= ¬p, (and certainly not both of them). If (N, t) |= p, then
I cannot announce “I do not like Monday”, whereas it is up to my free will, and what I like
is not necessary predetermined. If (N, t) |= ¬p, then I cannot announce “I like Monday”,
and I am forced to write “I like Monday”!
On Monday at 10am, both p and ¬p are announce-able and a suitable epistemic
possible world to describe my state at Monday, should not satisfy neither p nor
¬p.
Therefore, it is not possible to describe the actual state that I have on Monday via classic
epistemic possible worlds 1. We need a kind of possible worlds which at them neither p
nor ¬p is necessarily predetermined. We use Beth models (a semantic class for constructive
logic, see [3]) to obtain this aim.
The paper is organized as follows:
In section 1, we discuss the notion of possibility, and argue that non-predetermination
should be considered as a new possibility. We use Beth models (see[3]) to describe non-
predetermination possibilities, and then as semantics for our constructive epistemic
logic, we introduce a kind of Kripke models, called Beth-Kripke models, where each
possible world is a Beth model (instead of a valuation to atomic formula). We then
provide an axiomatization system and prove soundness and completeness theorem.
In section 2, we extend our proposed logic, by adding the public announcement opera-
tor. The public announcement operator is defined in the way that for those formulas,
say ϕ which their value are not yet determined in the actual world (say (M,s)),
both ϕ and ¬ϕ are announce-able (in other words, we have both (M,s) |= 〈ϕ〉⊤ and
(M,s) |= 〈¬ϕ〉⊤).
The surprise exam paradox, SEP (see [8, 9, 10]), was formulated via classic epistemic
logic in different ways [2, 9, 11, 13]. Also the paradox was formulated in constructive
analysis [1]. In section 3, we formally model SEP in the proposed constructive epis-
temic logic. Then, regarding non-predetermined worlds, we put forward a solution for
the paradox.
1 Constructive Possible Worlds
The semantics of classic propositional logic is introduced via valuations of atomic formulas
by True or False. Consider two atomic propositional formulas p and q. Classically, there
are exactly four different possible worlds (valuations) for p and q as follows:
1- p = True, q = True,
2- p = True, q = False,
1If we want to describe the actual state classically then we need to consider Temporal concepts and
thinking of temporal epistemic logics. However, in our work, we show that we can describe non-predetermined
cases without using temporal modals and operators.
3- p = False, q = True,
4- p = False, q = False.
However, the semantics of constructive (intuitionistic) propositional logic is not the same
semantics of classic propositional logic. The semantics of constructive propositional logic
is formally introduced by Kripke models or Beth models. In this paper, we consider Beth
models (see [3], and chapter 13 of [12]). A Beth model is a triple Θ = 〈Q,≤, F 〉, where
〈Q,≤〉 is a partially ordered set with the following condition that there exists a node α ∈ Q,
called root, such that for all β, γ ∈ Q, α ≤ β, α ≤ γ 2.
F is mapping assigning atomic formulas to elements of Q. More precisely, let AT be the set
all atomic propositional formulas. Then F : Q→ 2AT is a function subject to the following
condition: for all α, β ∈ Q, if α ≤ β then F (α) ⊆ F (β).
Notation 1.1 Given a Beth model Θ = 〈Q,≤, F 〉, instead of writing α ∈ Q, for simplicity,
we write α ∈ Θ.
A path P through a node α ∈ Θ is a maximal linearly ordered subset of Θ containing α.
A bar B for a node α ∈ Θ is a subset of Θ with the property that each path through α
intersects it.
The satisfaction relation ⊆ Θ × SENT (AT) (where SENT (AT) is the set of all
propositional formulas over AT), is defined inductively,
α  p iff there is a bar B for α such that for each β ∈ B, p ∈ F (β), (for atomic
p ∈ AT).
α  A ∧B iff α  A and α  B.
α  A ∨B iff there is a bar B for α, such that for each β ∈ B, β  A or β  B.
α  A→ B iff for each β ≥ α, β  A then β  B.
α  ¬A iff for each β ≥ α, β 6 A.
We say two Beth models (Θ1, α1) and (Θ2, α2) are equivalent whenever they satisfy the
same propositional formulas.
Theorem 1.2 Given a Beth model (Θ, α), for any proportional formula A,
a. α  A iff there is a bar B for α such that for all β ∈ B, β  A.
b. α 6 A iff there is a path P through α such that for each β ∈ P , β 6 A.
c. α ≤ β and α  A then β  A.
Proof. See [3]. ⊣
Let Γ be a set of propositional formulas. By Γ ⊢i A we mean A is derivable in construc-
tive propositional logic. By Γ |= A, we mean A is satisfied in all Beth models which satisfy
all formulas in Γ.
2This condition is extra, and we consider it here for convenience.
Theorem 1.3 Soundness and Completeness Theorem: Γ ⊢i A iff Γ |= A.
Proof.See [3]. ⊣
In the beginning of the section, we mentioned that there are four different possible
worlds for two atomic formulas p and q in classic view. In constructive propositional logic,
regarding Beth models (instead of valuations), the number of possible worlds are more than
four.
Let Γ = {p ∨ q,¬(p ∧ q)}. Classically, two possible worlds are considerable for Γ
c1- p = True, q = False, and
c2- p = False, q = True.
But there are three non-equivalent Beth models for Γ,
i1- (Θ, α), where Θ = {α}, and F (α) = {p},
i2- (Θ′, α′), where Θ′ = {α′}, and F (α′) = {q}, and
i3- (Θ′′, α′′), where Θ′′ = {α′′, β′′, γ′′}, F (α′′) = ∅, F (β′′) = {p}, F (γ′′) = {q}, α′′ ≤ β′′,
and α′′ ≤ γ′′.
The two cases i1 and i2 are the same classical cases c1 and c2, but the third one, i3, is
new. The possible world (Θ′′, α′′) is a situation where formulas p ∨ q,¬(p ∧ q) holds true
but neither p nor q are predetermined. The possibility of non-predetermination is regarded
in Beth models, whereas classically, it is presupposed that valuation of atomic formulas are
predetermined already.
Recalling the Surprise Exam Paradox (see section 3), suppose p stands for ”Tomorrow,
the teacher will take the exam”, and q stands for ” the teacher will take the exam the day
after tomorrow”
1- The Beth model (Θ, α) represents the possible world where it is already determined
that teacher will take the exam tomorrow.
2- The Beth model (Θ′, α′) represents the possible world where it is already determined
that teacher will take the exam the day after tomorrow.
3- The Beth model (Θ′′, α′′) represents the possible world where the teacher has not
already decided whether take the exam tomorrow or one day later. Classically, we
cannot represent the third possibility.
One may assume the root of the Beth model (Θ′′, α′′) as the current state of the possible
world. Other nodes with respect to partial order relation are future nodes of the current
state 3. Future is not predetermined and it is the teacher who determines it later by his
free will. It is up to free will of the teacher to take the exam tomorrow or not, and neither
the value of p nor the value of ¬p is not determined already. Beth models help us describe
non-predetermination as a new possibility. The non-predetermination is ignored in (classic)
epistemic logic.
3The reader may note that to regard future, we can also argue in terms of temporal logic. But constructive
(intuitionistic) logic, without having temporal modal operators, in some sense, considers this case. Therefore,
avoiding extra modal operators, we propose a constructive epistemic logic.
Definition 1.4 Let AT be a non-empty set of propositional variables, and A be a set of
agents. The language L(A,AT) is the smallest superset of AT such that
if ϕ,ψ ∈ L(A,AT) then ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), ϕ→ ψ, Kiϕ ∈ L(A,AT),
for i ∈ A.
For i ∈ A, Kiϕ has to be read as ‘agent i knows ϕ”.
Definition 1.5 A Beth-Kripke model M is a tuple M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉, where S is a non-
empty set of Beth models over AT as possible worlds, (each s ∈ S is a pointed Beth model
(Θs, αs) where αs is the root of Θs), and each ∼i is a binary accessibility relation between
worlds.
Let M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉 be a Beth-Kripke model, and Θ be an arbitrary Beth model of M
(i.e., Θ = Θs for some s ∈ S). We define the satisfaction relation M⊆ Θ × L(A,AT) as
follows:
- for all ϕ ∈ SENT (AT), for each α ∈ Θ, α M ϕ iff α  ϕ.
- For each α ∈ Θ, for each agent i ∈ A, α M Kiϕ iff for all Ω ∈ S, if Θ ∼i Ω, then for
all β ∈ Ω, β M ϕ.
- For each α ∈ Θ, α M ϕ ∧ ψ iff α M ϕ and α M ψ.
- For each α ∈ Θ, α M ϕ∨ψ iff there is a bar B ⊆ Θ for α, such that for each β ∈ B,
β M ϕ or β M ψ.
- For each α ∈ Θ, α M ϕ→ ψ iff for each β ≥Θ α, β M ϕ then β M ψ.
- α M ¬ϕ iff for each β ≥Θ α, β 6M ϕ.
Theorem 1.6 Let M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉 be a Beth-Kripke model, and Θ be an arbitrary Beth
model of M . For each α ∈ Θ, and ϕ ∈ L(A,AT), we have
a. α M ϕ iff there is a bar B for α such that for all β ∈ B, β M ϕ.
b. α 6M ϕ iff there is a path P through α such that for each β ∈ P , β 6M ϕ.
c. α ≤ β and α M ϕ then β M ϕ.
d. α M Kiϕ then for all β ∈ Θ, β M Kiϕ.
Proof. It is straightforward.⊣
Definition 1.7 Let ϕ ∈ L(A,AT) and M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉 be a Beth-Kripke model. We say
(M,s) satisfies ϕ, denoted by (M,s) |= ϕ, whenever the root of Θs satisfies the formula ϕ
regarding the model M , i.e., αs M ϕ.
Theorem 1.8 Let M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉, s ∈ S, and i ∈ A be an arbitrary agent. Also
let Γ = {ϕ ∈ SENT (AT) | (M,s) |= Kiϕ}. Then Γ is a constructive (intuitionistic)
propositional closed theory. That is, for every ψ ∈ SENT (AT), ψ ∈ Γ, iff ψ is derivable
from Γ in constructive propositional logic, Γ ⊢i ψ.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊢i ϕ in constructive (intuitionistic) logic. Then by soundness and com-
pleteness theorem 1.3, ϕ is satisfied in all Beth models which satisfy all formulas in Γ. Hence
ϕ is satisfied in all Beth model (Θt, αt) in model M , which t ∼i s. Therefore, by definition
of satisfaction for knowledge, we have (M,s) |= Kiϕ, and we are done. ⊣ Above theorem
declares that
knowing a fact in constructive point of view is to have a proof for the fact.
Theorem 1.9 Let M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉, s ∈ S, i ∈ A, and ϕ ∈ L(A,AT). Then (M,s) |=
Kiϕ ∨ ¬Kiϕ.
Proof. By definition 1.7, (M,s) |= Kiϕ ∨ ¬Kiϕ is equivalent to αs M Kiϕ ∨ ¬Kiϕ. Note
that, according to item d) of theorem 1.6, for all β ∈ Θs, if β M Kiϕ then for all δ ∈ Θs,
we have δ M Kiϕ. Therefore, Either none of the nodes of the Beth model Θ satisfies Kiϕ,
and consequently by definition 1.7, we have αs M ¬Kiϕ. Or all nodes of the Beth model
Θ satisfies Kiϕ, and consequently, αs M Kiϕ. Thus, we have αs M Kiϕ ∨ ¬Kiϕ. ⊣ The
above theorem says, knowing is decidable. Intuitionistic (constructive) propositional logic,
IPC (see [12], chapter 2), is effectively decidable. That is, it is decidable that whether a
formula is a theorem or not. As the notion of knowledge in intuitionism is considered equal
to having evidence (proof), it is plausible that for an appropriate constructive epistemic
logic knowing is decidable. The two above theorems justifies why we call our proposed
epistemic logic as a constructive epistemic logic.
1.1 Axiomatization
In this part, we introduce an axiomatization system dented by IS6, and prove soundness
and complexness theorem with respect to S5 Beth-Kripke models 4. The logic of IS6 is
much similar to the S5 epistemic logic introduced in [4], pages 26-29.
The constructive epistemic logic IS6 consists of axioms A1−A6 and the derivation rules
R1 and R2 given below
R1: ⊢ ϕ, ⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ⊢ ψ
R2: ⊢ ϕ⇒ Kiϕ, for all i ∈ A
A1: Axioms of constructive propositional logic
A2: (Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ→ ψ))→ Kiψ
A3: Kiϕ→ ϕ
A4: Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
A5: ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
A6: ¬Kiϕ ∨Kiϕ
4A Beth-Kripke model is S5 whenever the relations ∼i are reflexive, transitive, and Euclidian.
Theorem 1.10 (Soundness and Completeness). Axiom system IS6 is sound and complete
with respect to semantic class of S5 Beth-Kripke models.
Proof. ⊣
2 A Constructive Epistemic Public Announcement Logic
We extend the proposed logic by adding public announcement operator to construct a
constructive epistemic public announcement logic, CEPAL similar to the (classic) public
announcement logic [4], page 73,
2.1 Syntax
Given a finite set of agentsA, and a set of atomic formulasAT, the language of LIEPAL(A,AT)
is inductively defined by the BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ,ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | Kiϕ | [ϕ]ψ
where i ∈ A, and p ∈ AT.
2.2 Semantics
We describe public announcement operator on Beth-Kripke models. Let M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉
be a Beth-Kripke model. Let (Θs, αs) be a Beth model of the model M . For a formula ϕ,
we define the Beth model Θs|ϕ as follows:
• Θs|ϕ = {α ∈ Θs | α 6M ¬ϕ},
• the partial order relation of the Beth model Θs|ϕ is obtain by restriction of partial
order relation of the model Θs to the set of nodes in Θs|ϕ.
We let M |ϕ = 〈S
′, (∼′i)i∈A〉 with
S′ = {(Θs|ϕ, αs) | s ∈ S & (M,s) 6|= ¬ϕ}, and
∼′i=∼i ∩(S
′ × S′).
For each β ∈ Θs, we define β M [ϕ]ψ, if and only if for αs (the root of Θs) we have
αs 6M ¬ϕ and (Θs|ϕ, αs) M |ϕ ψ. We then define
(M,s) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M,s) 6|= ¬ϕ implies (M |ϕ, s) |= ψ
Where
The dual of [ϕ] is 〈ϕ〉:
(M,s) |= 〈ϕ〉ψ iff (M,s) 6|= ¬ϕ and (M |ϕ, s) |= ψ
Proposition 2.1 Let M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉 be a Beth-Kripke, and (Θ, α) be a Beth model of
the model M . For each formula ϕ, for each β ∈ Θ|ϕ, we have β  |(M |ϕ)ϕ.
Proof. It is straightforward.⊣
Announcing a formula ϕ, two kinds of updates happen on a Beth-Kripke model
I. Updating each possible world (Beth model) of the model:
In a constructive possible world (a Beth model (Θ, α)), some matters of the world are
predetermined and some others are not. When a formula ϕ is announced, all nodes of
the Beth model Θ, say γ ∈ Θ, which it is impossible that ϕ gets determined in future
(i.e., for all β ≥ γ, β 6M ϕ, and thus β M ¬ϕ) are removed.
II. Updating the indistinguishability relations of agents:
The set of epistemic possible worlds is restricted to those possible worlds which it is
possible that ϕ gets determined, and indistinguishability relations is the same relation
regarding remained possible worlds.
In (classic) public announcement logic, PAL (see [4], chapter 4), for a classic possible
world (M,s), and a formula ϕ, only one of the two formulas ϕ and ¬ϕ is announcable (an
executable announcement). It is because that in a classic possible world either ϕ is true
or ¬ϕ, and not both of them, and to announce a formula, the formula must be already
true in the actual world. Whereas, in our Beth-Kripke models, both ϕ and ¬ϕ could be
announcable! It is because that in a Beth model it is possible that neither ¬ϕ nor ¬¬ϕ are
satisfied.
For example, assume the Beth model (Θ, α), where Θ = {α, β, γ}, F (α) = ∅, F (β) =
{p}, F (γ) = {q}, α ≤ β, and α ≤ γ. Let M be a Beth-Kripke model with just one world
s, where Θs = Θ, and αs = α, and s ∼i s, for all i ∈ A. Both formula p and ¬p are
announcable (executable announcements) in (M,s) since (M,s) 6|= p and (M,s) 6|= ¬p, and
thus (M,s) |= 〈p〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p〉⊤.
The Beth-Kripke model M |p is a model with the world (Θ|p, α) which has two nodes α, β,
and F (β) = {p}, F (α) = ∅. We have (M |p, s) |= ¬q, and thus (M,s) |= [p]¬q.
The Beth-Kripke model M |¬p is a model with world (Θ|¬p, α) which has two nodes α γ,
and F (α) = ∅, F (γ) = {q}. We have (M |¬p, s) |= q, and thus (M,s) |= [¬p]q.
In (classic) public announcement logic, PAL (see [4], chapter 4), it is possible to translate
each formula in the language of public announcement logic to an equivalent formula in the
language of epistemic logic without public announcement (see proposition 4.22, [4]). In
contrast, in our proposed public announcement logic, there are formulas which are not
equivalent to any formula without announcement operator.
Proposition 2.2 Let AT = {p}. The formula 〈p〉⊤ is not equivalent to any propositional
formula ϕ ∈ SENT (AT).
Proof. Assume 〈p〉⊤ is equivalent to a propositional formula ϕ ∈ SENT (AT). Then for
every pointed Beth model (Θ, α), (Θ, α)  〈p〉⊤ ↔ ϕ. Consider the following Beth model
(Θ, α), where Θ = {α, β, γ}, F (α) = ∅, F (β) = {p}, F (γ) = ∅, α ≤ β, and α ≤ γ. We have
α  〈p〉⊤, by our assumption, we have α  ϕ. By item c) of theorem 1.2, γ  ϕ. Since
F (γ) = ∅, we have ϕ is a tautology, i.e., ϕ ↔ ⊤. Hence, we have 〈p〉⊤ is a tautology, i.e.,
〈p〉⊤ is satisfied in all Beth models. Contradiction. ⊣
Theorem 2.3 Regarding finite S5 Beth-Kripke models, the followings is valid, for every
ϕ,ψ ∈ LIEPAL(A,AT), and p ∈ AT.
[ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ψ)
Proof. ⊣
3 The Surprise Exam Paradox
We formulate the well-known Surprise Exam Paradox, SEP, in our constructive epistemic
public announcement logic. The SEP is as follows:
The teacher announces to the students:
you will have one and only one exam at 10am on one day in the last third days of
the next week (Wednesday-Thursday-Friday), but you will not know in advance
the day of exam.
The students, using a backward argument, reason that there can be no exam indeed:
- Friday is not the day of the exam. Since if it is, we will not have received the exam
by Thursday night, and as there is an exam in the week, then at Thursday night, we
will be able to know in advance the day of exam,
- Thursday is not the day of the exam. Since if it is, we will not have received the exam
by Wednesday night, and as there is an exam in the week, and it is not on Friday, then
at Wednesday night, we will know in advance the day of exam is on on Thursday,...
- and Wednesday is not the day of the exam by a similar argument,
- then none of the days is the day of exam.
The paradox was investigated in terms of (classic) epistemic notions by several people [2,
9, 11, 13]. For example, Gerbrandy sees the puzzle in the assumption that announcements
are in general successful [5], and Baltag, to solve the paradox, lets the students to revise
their trust to the teacher once they reach the paradox [7]. In [1], the paradox is investigated
in a constructive view, considering free will of the teacher. In this paper, we claim that
the puzzle in SEP is that students (wrongly) assume the day that teacher is
going to take the exam is predetermined!
Consider the following version of SEP which is obviously equivalent to the standard
version: The teacher announces to the students:
I like one and only one of the days among Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.
I start to announce one by one whether I like the days or not beginning with
Wednesday, then Thursday, and finally Friday. You will not know, in advance,
the day I like before I announce that I like that day.
Let AT = {p1, p2, p3} where
p1 stands for ”I like Wednesday”,
p2 stands for ”I like Thursday”, and
p3 stands for ”I like Friday”.
It is up to desire of the teacher to like which day, and his desire could be non-predetermined.
Therefore, the teacher can choose freely announce either p1 or ¬p1 (certainly, not both of
them together). But, in a classic epistemic possible world either p1 is true or ¬p1, and
thus just one of the formulas p1 and ¬p1 is an executable-announcement, and thus classic
epistemic possible worlds are not suitable to formulate the paradox.
When the teacher uses the term ‘like’, he means that he announces up to his free will, and
students must assume that both p1 and ¬p1 are executable-announcements at the beginning,
and if the teacher announces ¬p1 then both p2 and ¬p2 are executable-announcements, and
finally if the teacher first announces ¬p1 then announces ¬p2, at the end he can announce p3,
or in other words, p3 is an executable announcements. Therefore, more formally, if (M,s)
is a (constructive) epistemic possible world which represents the situation of the SEP then
we have
(M,s) |= 〈p1〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p1〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p1〉〈p2〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p1〉〈¬p2〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p1〉〈¬p2〉〈p3〉⊤.
Let us formally describe teacher’s announcement in the language of our proposed logic.
Claims0 The teacher claims that he likes one and only one of the days among Wednesday,
Thursday, and Friday:
ϕ0 :≡ (p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3) ∧ ¬(p1 ∧ p2) ∧ ¬(p1 ∧ p3) ∧ ¬(p2 ∧ p3).
The teacher says: ”I start to announce one by one whether I like the days or not beginning
by Wednesday, then Thursday, and finally Friday. You will not know, in advance, the day
I like before I announce that I like that day”.
He means that at least one of the three following claims is true.
claim1) I (the teacher) can announce that I like Wednesday, and you (students) would not
know that I like Wednesday before I announce it:
ϕ1 ≡: 〈p1〉⊤ ∧ ¬Kp1.
claim2) I can announce that I do not like Wednesday, and after that I can announce that I
like Thursday, but you would not know that I like Thursday before I announce it
ϕ2 :≡ 〈¬p1〉〈p2〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p1〉¬Kp2.
claim3) I can announce that I do not like Wednesday, and after that I can announce that I do
not like Thursday, and finally I can announce that I like Friday, but you would not
know that I like Friday before I announce it
ϕ3 :≡ 〈¬p1〉〈¬p2〉〈p3〉⊤ ∧ 〈¬p1〉〈¬p2〉¬Kp3.
In this way the teacher’s announcement is
ϕ0 ∧ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3).
The following Beth-Kripke model M = 〈S, (∼i)i∈A〉 represents the The (constructive)
epistemic world of SEP, with
S = {s},
A = {student},
∼student= {(s, s)},
where (Θs, αs) is defined as follows: Θs = {αs, β, γ, δ}, F (αs) = ∅, F (β) = {p1}, F (γ) =
{p2}, F (δ) = {p3}, and αs ≤ β, αs ≤ γ, αs ≤ δ.
One may easily verify that (M,s) |= ϕ0 ∧ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3).
The students reasons that the third claim, ϕ3, is not true as the teacher likes at least
one of the days, and after he announced that he does not like Wednesday and Thursday,
the student deduce that he must like Friday. However, students cannot apply a backward
argument in constructive epistemic logic.
The student correctly argues that the assumption of ϕ3 leads to contradiction, and
we also have (M,s) |= ¬ϕ3. Then they again correctly derives from (M,s) |= ¬ϕ3 that
(M,s) 6|= p3.
In classic epistemic logic negation of a formula is defined by non-satisfaction of the formula
(i.e., ((N, t) |= ¬ψ iff (N, t) 6|= ψ), thus students derive (M,s) |= ¬p3, and using ¬p3, by a
backward argument, they derive ¬p2 , and after that ¬p1.
However, in Beth-Kripke model, we cannot derive from (M,s) 6|= p3 that (M,s) |= ¬p3.
The atomic formula p3 is not predetermined at the node (Θs, αs), and we have αs 6 p3,
and αs 6 ¬p3. In this way, the student’s reasoning does not work in constructive epistemic
logic with public announcement.
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